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Myth-Busting and Entrepreneurship Policy: The Case of High 
Growth Firms 
 
 
Abstract  
Promoting high growth firms (HGFs) has become a strong fixation within enterprise policy. 
This is a debate article seeking to examine and challenge the mythology perpetuated by policy 
makers and embedded within high growth entrepreneurship policy frameworks.  Within the 
article we argue that a number of distinctive ‘myths’ have become deeply embedded within 
these policy frameworks.  Such myths have been built on misconceived preconceptions of 
HGFs, which has resulted in policy-makers taking a myopic view of these firms.  A key aim of 
the paper is to highlight how false perceptions of HGFs translate into inappropriate policy 
interventions.  The paper challenges some of the most commonly held myths about these 
firms (that they are predominantly young, small, high-tech, VC-backed, university spin-outs, 
who grow in an orderly organic fashion, operating similarly irrespective of location) and 
identifies a clear mismatch between how policy makers perceive HGFs and what they actually 
look like in reality.  Suggestions for the design of future policy approaches are forwarded.   
 
Key Words 
Myths    Entrepreneurship   High Growth Firms  
Gazelles   Enterprise Policy     
 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
Within the intellectual domain of entrepreneurship, “several pseudoscientific myths have 
developed” (Zahra and Schulte 1994, 86).   Importantly, these myths can also influence policy 
priorities (Gibb 2000; Xheneti, 2016).  Due to this, Rehn et al. (2013, 544) claim it is important 
scholars are able to challenge the “most valued assumptions and subject these to critical 
scrutiny”.  Taking up this challenge, this paper examines a number of key myths surrounding 
high growth firms (henceforth HGFs), famously christened ‘gazelles’ by David Birch (1981), 
perpetuated by policy makers.  The central contribution of this debate article is to challenge 
the myths embedded in policy making and to examine how these myths translate into 
misconceived policy approaches.   
 
In recent years, HGFs have become something of the ‘fixation’ within enterprise policy and 
are widely perceived to be critical for economic development (Acs et al. 2008; Shane 2009; 
Mason and Brown 2013; Bos and Stam 2014; Lee 2014; Autio and Rannikko 2016).  According 
to some, it is hard to overstate the impact of Birch’s original work on gazelles for policy-
making organisations such as the US Small Business Administration (Welter et al. 2016).  As 
Rehn et al. (2013, 547) note, there is an ongoing “fascination with high growth companies” 
within the policy community. The primary attraction of HGFs owes to their perceived ability 
to create ‘jobs’ (Henrekson and Johansson 2010; Coad et al. 2014).  In the UK, for example, 
research has found HGFs generate over half of all net new jobs despite representing a mere 
6% of the business base (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009).  Similar studies in the US (Decker et al. 
2015) and several European economies have replicated these findings (Brüderl and 
Preisendörfer 2000; Deschryvere 2008).  Such ‘job creation’ studies have helped to foster a 
burgeoning body of empirical research on HGFs (Henrekson and Johansson 2010), thus 
generating continued debate on their economic impact and the capability of policy makers to 
generate and support them (BERR 2008; Shane 2009; Greene 2012; Lee 2014; Nightingale and 
Coad 2014; Brown and Mawson, 2016a).  
 
This paper contends, however, that high growth entrepreneurship policy remains 
underpinned by a number of pervasive ‘myths’ which have become deeply engrained in policy 
frameworks.  In other words, within the policy community there seem to be very strong 
preconceived views of what HGFs look like and what assistance they require. This situation is 
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reminiscent of the ‘Blind Men and the Elephant’ story outlined by Gartner (2007), where 
various blind men touch different parts of an elephant and come away with very different 
views of an elephant’s characteristics. A similar situation exists with policy maker perceptions 
of HGFs.  Gartner (2007) notes that some entrepreneurship scholars are not conscious of their 
own “blind assumptions”. We contend that this equally applies to policy makers.  It is our 
belief that their views are strongly predicated on various ‘blind assumptions’ that do not 
match empirical reality.  Consequently, policy makers are often “looking in the wrong places 
for such firms” (Mason and Brown 2013, 214).    
 
There are various explanations for this perceptual mismatch that underpins the process of 
HGF ‘myth-building’.  It may be due in part to the actions of so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
(Kingdon 1984), key actors with a vested interest in particular policies (Flanagan et al. 2011).  
Hirunyawipada and Paswan (2013, 2333) claim that the ideas of many practitioners are 
inevitably “based on their past experiences”, which in turn leads to people sticking “to their 
tried and tested mental models”.  Through the actions of policy entrepreneurs, certain beliefs 
can quickly become embedded within public policy without any explicit acknowledgement or 
reasoning (Brown 2016).  There appears to be an institutional logic (Friedland and Alford 
1991) amongst these policy entrepreneurs of what HGFs look like, what their economic 
benefits are, and how best to foster them, which exists independently of – and sometimes in 
contrast to - the developing evidence base.1   
 
Another possible explanation for ‘myth-building’ within public policy centres on the selective 
use of empirical evidence.  Due to the so-called ‘rigour-relevance gap’, connectivity between 
scholarly entrepreneurship research and practice is low (Frank and Landström, 2016). 
Therefore, while the empirical literature surrounding HGFs has expanded considerably over 
the last decade, assumptions about these firms within public policy have failed to catch-up 
with the expanding evidence. This may also hinge on the fact that the bulk of 
entrepreneurship research continues to focus on high-growth, technology-enabled, venture 
capital-backed businesses such as Apple, Google and Amazon (Welter et al. 2016).  Scholars 
                                                          
1 Such views have arguably been further propagated by the wider ‘high growth firms industry’, comprising, inter alia, the OECD, government 
policy makers, think tanks such as Nesta and the Kauffman Foundation, funding organisations, economic development agencies, consultants, 
intermediaries (corporate lawyers etc.) and university technology transfer offices (TTOs).   
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are critical of the over-emphasis on this “Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship”, which in 
actual fact constitutes a “tiny group of outliers” yet drives much of “the direction of recent 
public policy” (Welter et al. 2016, 2-3).  
 
Nightingale and Coad (2014, 124), note that bias within entrepreneurship research is largely 
driven by “demands for positive evidence which create a shift toward increasingly positive 
interpretations as one moves from analysis, through the grey literature, to policy.”  The logical 
consequence of this is that the evidence base is often used selectively by policy makers to 
justify specific actions and interventions, rather than as a theoretical foundation upon which 
to build and develop appropriate interventions from the ‘bottom-up’.  So, whilst the evidence 
base surrounding HGFs remains incomplete, policy makers have tended to adopt a highly 
selective approach when drawing on it for policy development. This is evidenced in policy 
documentation and outputs through the continued reliance on select (sometimes outdated) 
sources of literature and evidence. This results in the creation of policy frameworks and 
support mechanisms that are often misguided and fail to effectively provide appropriate 
support to the specific needs of growing firms (Nightingale and Coad 2014).   
 
This is not a conventional paper.  While certain myths associated within scholarship on rapid 
firm growth have been highlighted (Kiviluoto, 2013), this paper specifically focuses on the 
misconceptions within public policy.  Indeed, following others (Power and Malmberg 2008; 
Brown 2016), this is a debate article seeking to examine and challenge the mythology 
perpetuated by policy makers and embedded within high growth entrepreneurship policy 
frameworks.  It is not intended to be a comprehensive meta-analysis of the HGF literature, 
but rather a critical assessment of current HGF policy closely linked to a rigorous review of 
the current empirical literature base on HGFs.  Arguably, the nascence of the literature has 
allowed a gap to exist between the empirical reality of HGFs and policy makers’ perceptions 
of them.  This disconnect may in part explain why a number of myths within the policy making 
community continue to hold sway over current rhetoric and interventions.  This paper 
therefore makes an important contribution to both the HGF literature and the 
entrepreneurship policy literature by highlighting how certain assumptions become 
translated into inappropriate policy initiatives.   
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Given space constraints, our focus will be limited to the myths and evidence base pertaining 
to the specific nature or characteristics of HGFs themselves. This part of the HGF phenomenon 
is of particular importance to high growth entrepreneurship policy formulation and 
implementation, particularly given the focus on how these firms can be developed and 
cultivated.  Indeed, these characteristics are often used as implicit forms of policy targeting. 
The central question guiding this paper is “what are the main myths associated with HGFs 
within high growth entrepreneurship policy and what impact have these had on the 
entrepreneurship policy domain”?   
 
Whilst in essence a debate article, it is strongly evidence-based and draws on three main 
sources of empirical evidence.  First, the researchers undertook a rigorous review of existing 
empirical studies on the nature and characteristics of HGFs.  The review examined the 
literature on HGFs, but concentrated on studies published since the previous meta-analysis 
of this field in 2010 (see Henrekson and Johansson 2010). To be included, studies needed to 
be empirical papers, written in English, published in peer reviewed journals and had to be 
focused specifically on HGFs.  Other key words such as ‘high-impact’, ‘rapid-growth’ and 
‘gazelle’ were also included in search terms. Second, a similar review of policy programmes 
was conducted which focused on interventions and frameworks specifically targeting HGFs 
(or using the other key words above) (Brown et al, 2017).  Policy documents and economic 
strategy documents serve as a proxy for understanding institutional logic amongst policy 
makers.  Documentation was required to be published in English, with no limitations placed 
on country of origin.  The majority of policy documents came from OECD countries.  
Additionally, the eligibility criteria in various high growth programmes were examined.  While 
this information is not always easy to obtain for all programmes, many support agency 
websites outline their criteria for inclusion on programmes.  Finally, the paper also draws on a 
large programme of qualitative research conducted by the authors between 2008-2014, 
which included more than 50 interviews with Scottish HGFs and 20 interviews with policy 
makers.  These interviews were further augmented by work undertaken by the authors for 
the LEED programme of the OECD on different policy approaches designed to support HGFs 
(OECD 2013).   
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. It begins with a discussion of definitional 
issues, followed by some of the key features of the HGF literature.  We then review the 
empirical evidence base on the nature and characteristics of HGFs, linking findings to a 
number of key myths that are predominant within high growth entrepreneurship policy.  The 
paper then provides a discussion of the implications of recent HGF studies for the current 
shape of policy.  Finally, conclusions and suggestions for further research are highlighted.   
 
2. Definitional Issues  
Owing to the fact that HGFs can be measured in different ways (Moreno and Coad 2015), 
there is ongoing debate over the merits and drawbacks of different definitions (Coad et al. 
2014; Daunfeldt et al. 2014; Lee, 2014; Anyadike-Danes et al. 2015).  Whilst this debate is not 
the focus of this paper, definitional issues are important because conceptions of business 
growth vary markedly between scholars and practitioners (Achtenhagen et al. 2010).  We wish 
to argue that perceptions of business growth also appear to differ between scholars and 
policy makers.  Indeed, much of the early literature failed to use a consistent metric for 
measuring firm growth (Henrekson and Johansson 2010), drawing on a range of metrics such 
as employment, turnover and assets (Delmar et al. 2003).  Since the mid-2000s, however, 
there have been concerted moves by the OECD to standardize the way in which HGFs are 
formally defined and identified.  Under the OECD’s definition, a HGF is considered to be ‘an 
enterprise with average annualised growth (in number of employees or turnover) greater than 
20% per annum, over a three year period, with a minimum of 10 employees at the beginning 
of the growth period’ (OECD 2008, 61).   
 
As with any standardized definition, a number of problematic issues have been raised. Key 
concerns are that the definition omits firms which may be growing rapidly but fall just outside 
this exacting growth threshold (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2015); turnover and employment do 
not necessarily reflect how entrepreneurs themselves conceptualise growth (Achtenhagen et 
al. 2010); and that the mathematics of percentages biases the measure towards smaller – and 
hence newer – businesses. There is also concern over what should be measured. While 
studies have found a link between employment growth and turnover growth measures (Coad 
2007), others find that different definitions and measures identify different groups of firms 
(Daunfeldt et al. 2014), which potentially has significant implications for policy development. 
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Although many early studies focused on growth in employment (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009), 
there is now an increasing use of growth in turnover as a means of defining HGFs (e.g. Mason 
and Brown 2013; Du and Temouri 2015).  Given that this metric overlooks profitability, some 
have strongly challenged whether sales growth is in fact a suitable measure of firm “success” 
(Kiviluoto, 2013).  Despite its criticisms, the OECD measurement criteria has merits in terms 
of providing a foundation for comparability amongst studies and has been widely used in 
recent years by both researchers (e.g. Mohr et al. 2014; Brown and Mawson 2016b) and policy 
makers. Interestingly, some policy makers have adjusted the OECD measurement criteria to 
reflect the nature of their local economy (DETINI, 2014).2  
 
Irrespective of the definition and measurement criteria used to identify HGFs, it is important 
to note that rapid growth is highly episodic in nature (Garnsey et al. 2006) and thus the 
population of HGFs is constantly fluctuating.  High growth is rarely persistent in firms 
(Nicholls-Nixon 2005; Hölzl 2014) and therefore high growth in one period of time does not 
guarantee sustained high growth (Coad et al. 2013; Daunfeldt and Halvarsson 2015). Hence, 
it is crucial to bear in mind that high growth is not a ‘characteristic’ of a sub-set of firms, but 
rather a state that some firms temporarily experience (Brown and Mawson 2013).  This means 
that HGFs are effectively a ‘moving target’, making them a difficult cohort of businesses for 
researchers (and policy makers) to identify and target, particularly before a period of high 
growth commences (Freel 1998).  As a result, many studies have focused on identifying, 
counting and investigating HGFs ex-poste.  This has, in some respects, left the high growth 
entrepreneurship literature theoretically and empirically underdeveloped (Leitch et al. 2010; 
Demir et al. 2016), which has in turn allowed for myths held within high growth 
entrepreneurship policy circles to become further entrenched. 
 
3. Recent High Growth Firm literature 
As noted, a key feature of the high growth entrepreneurship literature, and firm growth 
research more generally, has been a strong focus on the questions of ‘how many’ and ‘how 
much’, rather than questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ firms achieve growth (Henrekson and 
                                                          
2 In Northern Ireland, for example, policy makers decided to remove the minimum employment threshold of 10 employees owing to the 
extremely low proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises within the local economy which is dominated by micro enterprises (DETINI, 
2014).    
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Johansson 2010; Leitch et al. 2010; McKelvie and Wiklund 2010). The consequence of this 
focus on measurement is that “our current understanding remains limited” (Dobbs and 
Hamilton 2007, 315).  Indeed, a major review of the empirical research on firm growth 
concluded that the “stochastic part of the variation by far outweighs the systematic part. In 
other words, explained variance in growth research is notably low” (McKelvie and Wiklund 
2010, 277). Thus, some observers claim that deciphering the causal factors underpinning 
rapid firm growth is as random as a ‘coin toss’ (Coad et al. 2013) and that growth “remains 
something of an enigma” (Roper and Hart 2013, 11). This myopic focus on HGF growth rates 
has also largely overlooked crucially important aspects of firm growth, notably firm 
profitability and sustainability (Brännback et al. 2013) and wider productivity (Daunfeldt et al. 
2014). 
 
Despite these oversights, the on-going development of the HGF literature has enabled us to 
speak with increasing confidence about what HGFs are and, more importantly, what they are 
not. A key initial observation from the empirical findings concerns the ‘pervasive 
heterogeneity’ within growing firms (Coad 2009).  There is no such thing as a ‘typical’ HGF: 
these businesses are of varying ages and sizes, operate across a range of sectors, exhibit a 
variety of business models, management styles and ownership structures and achieve growth 
through a number of mechanisms and channels (Mason and Brown, 2013).  The antecedents 
of growth are equally diverse and complex (Brown and Mawson 2013). It is important to note 
that the overwhelming majority of studies have been conducted in North America and 
Europe.  Although some work has been done in China (Zhang et al. 2008), sub-Saharan Africa 
(Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010) and New Zealand (Hinton and Hamilton 2013; 
Satterthwaite and Hamilton, 2016), the current conceptualisation (and understanding) of 
HGFs is very much predicated on observations from a very limited number of similar (i.e. 
advanced industrial) economies. HGFs in developing or transition contexts are recognised to 
differ somewhat from those within OECD countries given issues like institutional factors 
(Krasniqi and Desai, 2016) and thus require further investigation.  
 
So what else does the literature on the nature of HGFs tell us?  Research has strongly 
corroborated the role of HGFs as job creators, with a meta-analysis of the empirical evidence 
base concluding that this is perhaps the most unambiguous finding across most of the high 
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growth literature (Henrekson and Johansson 2010). There is now, however, evidence to 
suggest that employment effects from growth are less straightforward than previously 
assumed, particularly if acquisition is involved (Daunfeldt et al. 2015a). According to 
observers, “at the macro level, growth by acquisition may simply ‘transplant’ jobs from a 
smaller firm into a larger acquiring firm, thus leading to net zero employment gain” (McKelvie 
and Wiklund 2010, 282).  Although some exceptions exist (Deschryvere 2008), quantitative 
studies have been largely unable to distinguish between firms that grow organically and those 
that grow through acquisition, although there is increasing recognition in the literature that 
some HGFs choose to actively pursue growth via acquisition (Mawson and Brown, 2016).   
 
Few studies have tracked where HGFs are creating jobs, but recent work suggests the 
geography of job creation in these firms is far from straightforward (Brown and Mawson 
2016b).  It has been noted that HGFs are likely to operate from multiple locations, often in 
different countries (Mason et al. 2015), which has implications for the geography of where 
jobs are located. This means that HGFs might not be as significant job creators in their local 
‘home’ regions or economies after all (Brown and Mawson 2016b).  Future research on HGFs 
therefore needs to clearly differentiate between the gross and net impact of HGFs, including 
geographical considerations, and also their direct and indirect contributions to employment, 
which all have critical implications on the actual impact of these firms in job creation and 
wider economic development and productivity (Daunfeldt et al. 2014). 
 
Despite these emerging empirical insights, our knowledge of the nature of HGFs remains 
nascent (Demir et al. 2016) and the high growth entrepreneurship literature base needs 
further development (Coad et al. 2014). While the evidence base has helped to inform new 
strands of HGF research – and fostered continued conceptual development from HGF 
researchers – findings have not always been well utilised by policy makers.  Of course, the 
extreme diversity of HGFs creates difficulties for policy makers (Nightingale and Coad 2014) 
on account of their obsession with designing interventions that target specific types of firms, 
typically according to sector (Lee 2014).  As a result, many of the assumptions and findings 
from the very early HGF literature, even dating back to David Birch’s seminal studies in the 
1970s and 80s (Birch, 1979; 1981), have continued to dominate policy discourse and 
development, despite new (and sometimes contradictory) findings emerging.  An example of 
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this is the continued focus by policy makers on start-ups generally, despite the evidence 
showing most start-ups generate little in the way of economic value commensurate with the 
value of the support they receive (Atherton 2006; Shane 2009; Fritsch and Storey 2014; 
Mason and Brown, 2014).   
 
4. The ‘Vital Myths’ Surrounding HGFs 
It appears that certain myths have taken hold within the policy community about the nature 
of HGFs, perhaps stemming from the implicit assumptions held by policy makers. These have 
become deeply embedded in the policy community and have in turn strongly shaped the 
design of interventions designed to foster and support HGFs.  Having extensively reviewed 
policy documentation pertaining to HGFs, as well as having conducted numerous interviews 
with policy makers, we identified seven key ‘myths’ that are explicitly and implicitly 
embedded within the policy discourse surrounding HGFs.   
 
Whilst this list is not intended to be exhaustive – there are other pervading ‘myths’ and logics 
which could also be addressed – these appear to be particularly influential institutional logics 
within the HGF policy sphere, which have had significant influence on the shape and scope of 
current HGF policy frameworks and interventions.  It is important to note that not all these 
myths are universally adopted by all policy makers in all institutional contexts, but from our 
review these are the most common and pervasive myths still actively influencing HGF policy.  
We now examine each of these myths in turn. Whilst we attempt to critically assess each myth 
and its policy impact, our purpose is not to provide a balanced review of the literature, but 
rather to explore the impact of these myths in terms of the design of policy instruments.  
 
Myth #1 HGFs are all young and small 
Given that interest in HGFs stemmed from the observation that young, small fast-growing 
firms created the bulk of jobs (Birch 1979; 1981), it is unsurprising that HGFs remain 
conceptualised within policy circles as being dynamic young ventures. For example, policy 
makers in New Zealand still hold to the belief that “High-growth businesses are often small or 
young businesses” (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment 2013, 6). Age and size are 
often conflated by policy makers, despite being discrete (if related) concepts. Part of the 
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explanation for this is that many studies have focused on the relative growth of firms, which 
tends to oversample smaller firms – growth of 20% is clearly easier for a small operation than 
it is for a larger one.  A number of empirical studies have also demonstrated the importance 
of new/young firms as contributors to the cohort of HGFs. Indeed, the first meta-analysis of 
the empirical HGF literature found that HGFs tend to be younger on average (Henrekson and 
Johansson 2010).    
 
As the literature base develops, however, is has become increasingly apparent that policy 
assumptions about HGF age and size do not always hold true.  Indeed, Birch himself noted 
that “gazelles move between small and large quickly – at various times in either direction – 
and to classify them by their size is to miss their unique characteristics” (Birch and Medoff, 
1994, p. 163).  In a recent review of the high growth literature, one scholar noted that the 
HGFs accounting for most employment growth “tend to be larger and more mature” 
(Audretsch, 2012, p. 29).  Recent evidence further indicates that the majority of HGFs are in 
fact older and larger than previously believed.  Research in the US found that HGFs are on 
average 25 years old and that even smaller HGFs (employing 1-19 employees) exhibited a 
more advanced average age of 17 years (Acs et al. 2008).  In the UK, it has been found that 
70% of HGFs are at least five years old (NESTA 2009), while survey-based research in Scotland 
identified that some HGFs are over 25 years old (Mason et al. 2015).  Across Europe, similar 
findings have occurred: Danish HGFs were found to have a mean age of 13 years (Senderovitz 
et al. 2015) and a Spanish study found no bias towards younger firms amongst Spanish HGFs 
(Segarra and Teruel 2014). 
 
Another interesting observation relates to the age of the entrepreneurs running HGFs.  While 
some early work found the founder’s age to be negatively correlated with rapid growth 
(Brüderl and Preisendörfer 2000), a recent study found that the average age of entrepreneurs 
in HGFs is significantly more than 40 years (Senderovitz et al. 2015). Recent interview-based 
studies conducted in the UK corroborate that these entrepreneurs tend to be older and more 
experienced than in common depictions of fast-growing start-ups (Mason et al. 2015).  This 
chimes with a range of empirical studies demonstrating the vital importance of pre-existing 
experience and relational connections in boosting firm performance (Nicholls-Nixon 2005; 
Moreno and Casillas 2007).  Indeed, one important spillover from experience is the ability to 
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convince investors of the credibility of the venture’s future growth prospects (Barringer et al. 
2005). Many high growth programmes, however, continue to specifically target de novo 
entrepreneurs with little or no experience (OECD 2013).  A good example being the High 
Growth Spin Out Programme operated by Scottish Enterprise, which specifically targets 
(mostly young) university academics to help commercialise novel intellectual property (IP), 
most of whom have no prior entrepreneurial (or indeed private sector) experience.              
 
The empirical evidence challenges the assumption by policy-makers that firms (and by 
extension entrepreneurs) need to be young or small to achieve significant growth and raises 
important questions about how policy-makers can best identify, target and support older and 
more established growth-oriented entrepreneurial firms.  Much of the support which falls 
under the heading of support for ‘high growth entrepreneurship’ typically targets very young, 
early stage enterprises and young entrepreneurs (OECD 2013) as reflected in a range of 
publicly-funded business incubators and growth accelerators evident in most OECD 
economies (Smallbone et al. 2002; OECD 2013).  Plus, many high growth programmes, such 
as the NIY programme operated by Tekes in Finland, have explicit age criteria stipulating 
participant firm age which, in the case of Tekes, must be less than five or six years (Autio and 
Rannikko 2016).3  Yet, given that many HGFs emerge out of well-established firms, much of 
the ‘future HGF’ base are not eligible for these programmes and fall outside the remit of 
business incubators, business planning and start-up services and small-scale (or seed) start up 
financing. This creates a mismatch between the support systems in place and the target 
market of a vast number of potential HGFs.  Indeed, the dynamics of micro-firms are 
recognised to “differ markedly from those associated with their high-potential counterparts” 
(Lerner 2009, 6). Therefore, conflating the two is bad public policy (Shane 2009).   
 
Myth #2 HGFs are predominantly high tech  
Despite significant academic and policy interest in technology-based or ‘high tech’ firms 
(Brown and Mason 2014), the empirical evidence emphasises that HGFs are not synonymous 
with high tech industries (Brännback et al. 2011; Vanacker and Manigart 2010; Daunfeldt et 
al. 2015b). This is not to say that some high-tech firms will not eventually become HGFs - this 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that some high growth programmes do encourage participation by more mature companies, such as the Growth Firm 
Service in Finland (Autio et al. 2007).  This programme offers a one-stop-shop for a range of different support agencies in Finland.     
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is clearly not the case, especially in dynamic regional economies with strong levels of 
entrepreneurship and institutional conditions to promote technology companies such as 
Cambridge or London in the UK. The strong belief within the UK, and indeed most advanced 
economies (Brown and Mason 2014), that high-tech sectors are significant generators of HGFs 
is, however, erroneous and misleading (Brännback et al. 2011; Welter et al. 2016).  Despite 
robust evidence to the contrary, “there is still the popular belief among politicians that high 
tech sectors are the most likely to produce HGFs” (Moreno and Coad 2015, 14).   
 
In the UK, for example, research shows that only around 15% of HGFs are operating in high 
tech sectors; this figure is slightly higher for the South East of England at just over 20%, but 
for most other regions the prevalence of high tech HGFs is between 12-16% (Brown and 
Mason 2014).  Similar work in Belgium found that 80% of HGFs were represented in industries 
generally considered “low-tech” (Vanacker and Manigart 2010).  Many of these firms are 
found in traditional industries, such as construction and manufacturing, as well as business 
and personal services.  A number of studies have identified that HGFs are overrepresented in 
services compared to other sectors (Henrekson and Johansson 2010), especially knowledge-
intensive services (Daunfeldt et al. 2015b). The wide distribution of HGFs across different 
sectors, combined with the lack of a link between HGFs and high-tech sectors, holds for most 
countries (Bleda et al. 2013) and thus it is important to emphasise the sectoral heterogeneity 
of HGFs. 
 
It is possible that policy makers have crudely equated ‘high-tech’ with levels of innovativeness 
within firms, as evidenced by the wide range of ‘innovation’ programmes targeted at HGFs.  
Yet the majority of recent work shows that HGFs are highly innovative, irrespective of their 
industrial sector (O’Regan et al. 2006; Segarra, and Teruel 2014).  Coad and Rao (2008), for 
example, found that innovativeness (measured as patents for R&D spending) is strongly 
correlated to sales growth in HGFs.  The precise nature of their innovation behaviour suggests, 
however, that HGFs may depart from conventional R&D intensive firms, as the innovative 
capabilities of these firms are built on the exploration of familiar technologies (Colombelli et 
al. 2014).  This echoes other recent empirical work, which found that HGFs tend not to be 
disruptive innovators, but rather modifiers of existing technologies (Hinton and Hamilton 
2013; Mason and Brown 2013).   Similarly, Parker et al. (2010) found that product innovation 
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was negatively associated with becoming a HGF, but an “active use of marketing” was 
positively linked. Another recent dimension to this debate is the observation that innovation 
by HGFs is heavily mediated by the nature of the competitive environment within which 
individual firms operate (Mazzucato and Parris 2015).     
 
Despite the empirical evidence, many HGF policy interventions remain focused on high-tech 
firms and have criteria explicitly favouring inclusion of these companies.  In the Netherlands, 
for example, most high growth programmes are aimed at “innovative small firms and techno-
starters”, with the TechnoPartner programme a core offering targeting “high-tech start-ups” 
(Scales 2007, 15).  This emphasis is often reflected in programme eligibility criteria.  For 
example, the aforementioned NIY programme operated by Tekes in Finland requires 
participants to have a minimum expenditure of 15% of turnover on R&D (Autio and Rannikko 
2016).  Similarly, the High Growth Start-up Unit operated by Scottish Enterprise has explicit 
eligibility criteria stating “your business needs to be commercialising potentially disruptive 
intellectual assets that are likely to achieve revenues of £5 million within five years”.4  Given 
the nature of R&D focused innovation support, this will strongly favour high-tech firms at the 
expense of firms that are innovative in a wider sense, thus potentially overlooking a large 
proportion of HGFs. In New Zealand, for example, some analysis shows that the single largest 
expenditure area of high growth policy is business R&D grants, which accounts for around 
40% of overall expenditure aimed at fostering HGFs.5     
 
In terms of future policies designed for HGFs, given that genuinely ‘high tech’ firms comprise 
only a small part of the HGF base, policy interventions aimed at this sector (e.g. R&D 
assistance for product innovation) could be scaled back accordingly, allowing for greater 
resources to be allocated to different types of marketing-related support for firms across a 
variety of industry sectors to best support the HGF population as a whole.  Other more broadly 
focused sectors, such as business services, might pose “better opportunities” for targeted 
firm growth support (Buss 2002, 18). 
 
                                                          
4  This quote was taken from the Scottish Enterprise website: https://www.scottish-enterprise.com/services/support-for-
entrepreneurs/high-growth-support/are-you-eligible 
5 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, (2013) High-growth businesses in New Zealand 
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Myth #3 Universities are a major source of HGFs 
Related to the myth of high tech, there appears to be an entrenched belief within public policy 
that universities play a strong role in generating HGFs (Power and Malmberg 2008; Brännback 
et al. 2011).  Policy makers now view universities as a core part of their high growth 
entrepreneurship policies (Brown and Mason 2014).  This is evident in the provision of 
considerable funding dedicated towards creating entrepreneurial universities through 
activities such as incubation facilities, spin-out programmes and angel clubs (Audretsch et al. 
2016; Brown 2016).  In Germany, for example, the government-funded EXIST programme 
aims to promote technology and knowledge-based start-ups through innovation grant 
funding.6  University-based spinouts (USOs) are observed by policy makers as an economically 
powerful subset of high technology start-ups, providing a key conduit for the creation of new 
high-tech firms (Rothaermel et al. 2007).  Despite this belief, the evidence strongly indicates 
that very few USOs grow and the vast majority remain very small (Harrison and Leitch 2010).  
Following a major investigation into the sources of high growth in the Scottish economy, 
researchers concluded that “very few university spin-offs become high growth firms” (Brown 
and Mason 2014, 780).  Indeed, recent comparative research on USOs and company spin-offs 
(CSOs) found that the performance of CSOs in terms of sales growth and survival rates is 
considerably higher (Wennberg et al. 2011).  Firms spawned by large corporates are a much 
more significant source of high growth than USOs, particularly when entrepreneurs have 
worked in larger corporate environments (Barringer et al. 2005; Wennberg et al. 2011).  The 
evidence suggests that, in most types of entrepreneurial ecosystems, universities will not 
become a hotbed of rapidly growing entrepreneurial companies (Mason and Brown 2014). 
 
In some instances, moreover, links to local universities make a very small contribution to the 
knowledge base of HGFs (Mason et al. 2015).  For the vast majority of HGFs, universities are 
rarely used as a key ‘source’ of innovation (Deiaco et al. 2012).  A number of studies show 
that more important drivers of ‘open’ innovation for these firms are suppliers, customers and 
end-users (Wennberg 2013) or even acquired companies (Mawson and Brown 2016).  These 
findings have led some to claim that the significance placed on universities in technology 
transfer and commercialization policies to generate USOs, or new-starts more generally, has 
                                                          
6 http://www.exist.de/EN/Programme/About-EXIST/content.html 
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been greatly exaggerated (Harrison and Leitch 2010), especially in peripheral regional 
economies (Brown 2016). Many of the spin-outs created resemble “science projects” (Bhidé 
2008), rather than businesses with growth – let alone high growth – potential.  Part of this 
may stem from the fact that a large proportion of USOs are heavily supported in business 
incubation programmes via universities and other publicly-funded R&D support schemes 
(Bruneel et al. 2012), despite increasing recognition that acceleration rather than incubation 
models are more appropriate for developing firms with growth potential (Brown and Mawson 
2016a).  Such intensive early stage support for embryonic business concepts can effectively 
result in ‘killing firms with kindness’, preventing them from developing as independent and 
self-sufficient organisations. 
 
It is important to stress that the role of universities in both fostering and assisting HGFs will 
be highly context dependent (Welter 2011).  While in many cases their role in fostering HGFs 
may be marginal, as may be their role in knowledge transfer, this situation will vary in 
different spatial contexts.  Compared to peripheral areas, the situation is likely to be 
significantly different in dynamic entrepreneurial regions that have large research-intensive 
universities, such as Cambridge in the UK or Boston in the US (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005).  
Not only do some regions such as these generate more USOs than others, but these kinds of 
dynamic ecosystems then become magnets for other types of businesses owing to their 
superior entrepreneurship infrastructure such as access to different sources of funding, 
acceleration facilities and access to human capital.  This would support the fact that the 
geography of HGFs is often closely linked to key urban population centres, which often feature 
strong universities (Stam 2005; Rice et al. 2016). Indeed, recent research in the US 
documenting the locational determinants of HGFs has found them to be linked to locations 
with higher levels of educational attainment (Li et al. 2016).  So while universities may be 
marginal in terms of their direct contribution to the high growth population, they 
nevertheless play a key role in shaping the overall entrepreneurial ecosystem within which 
growth-oriented businesses form and grow (Mason and Brown 2014; Spigel 2015).   
   
Myth #4 HGFs are mostly VC-backed 
Related to the assumptions that HGFs are young and high-tech, they are also perceived within 
policy circles to require venture capital (henceforth VC) and other forms of entrepreneurial 
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finance such as funding from business angels (see OECD 2011).  According to recent research 
by the World Economic Forum (2014, 92), VC is the type of financing high-growth oriented 
founders find most “attractive”.  Indeed, one study examining HGFs in the US and UK bluntly 
concluded that equity investments are the “most appropriate type of finance for high growth 
firms” (BERR 2008, 28).  Equity finance is also considered “particularly suitable for growing 
businesses” to enable them to “scale-up up to become the household names of tomorrow” 
(British Business Bank 2016, 56).  This assumption, however, is often misplaced as this view 
of HGFs is very much influenced by the previous myth that they are concentrated in high tech 
sectors. For example, this is evident in current VC finance provision in Denmark, operated via 
the Danish Growth Fund (a state-operated investment fund), which expects participant firms 
to be companies with “highly innovative products, service, business plan, distribution etc.” 
focused on scaling up in Denmark and internationally.7 
 
It has been noted by several authors that relatively little is known about the financial affairs 
of HGFs (Vanacker and Manigart 2010; Demir et al. 2016).  However, recent empirical 
evidence from the UK indicates that only a tiny fraction of UK HGFs are VC-backed (Brown 
and Lee 2014).  As few as 1-2% of UK SMEs generally have been found to seek VC or other 
forms of equity finance (van der Schans 2015).  Fifteen years ago, a study of high growth start-
ups found that only 4% were using venture capital, while the vast majority were either using 
their own internal funds or conventional debt-finance such as loans (Smallbone et al. 2002).  
More recently, survey evidence found that a very similar figure of UK high growth SMEs (4.8%) 
have been found to utilise risk finance such as venture capital or business angel funding 
(Brown and Lee 2014).  The most common types of finance used amongst these HGFs were 
banks loans (48.6%) and bank overdrafts (18.4).  Interestingly, the same study found that 
HGFs were more reliant on debt-based sources of finance than non-HGF SMEs (Brown and 
Lee, 2014).  Given that these studies have all been conducted in the UK, it would be useful for 
researchers to examine the prevalence of VC-backed HGFs in other countries.   
 
This does not, of course, deny the crucial role that VC plays in helping to stimulate rapid firm 
growth within certain types of innovative companies with upside potential (Davila et al. 2003; 
                                                          
7 This quote was taken from the Danish Growth Fund website: http://www.vf.dk/saadan-goer-vi/venturekapital.aspx 
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Audretsch and Lehmann 2004).  High-tech R&D-based start-ups often require equity funding 
to overcome high levels of informational opacity and a lack of revenue (Berger and Udell 
1998).  While VC-backed companies constitute a tiny fraction of SMEs, some can become 
‘blockbuster’ success stories such as Apple and Google.8  While some of these knowledge-
based and technology-based firms tend to exhibit higher rates of growth (Audretsch 2012), 
these firms are not abundant in most economies. VC-backed firms often comprise a tiny 
minority of start-ups (Hellmann and Puri 2000).  Even in the US, angel finance and VC – at 
3.59% and 1.85% respectively –  represents a relatively small proportion of small business 
finance (Berger and Udell 1998). Recent data from a Federal Reserve survey in the US shows 
that risk equity funding is currently used by around 1% of US SMEs (Miller et al. 2016).9  The 
majority of small firms choose insider sources of finance such as the ‘3Fs’ – founder, family 
and friends.  Indeed, many entrepreneurs also choose to use bootstrapping techniques like 
‘bricolage’ (Baker and Nelson 2005), creative ways of minimizing or eliminating the need for 
finance by securing resources at little or no cost, to fund the start-up and early stages of their 
businesses (Bhidé 1991).  These ‘lean venture’ strategies minimise recourse to external capital 
in some entrepreneurial firms (Mohr et al. 2014).  Evidently, there are many entrepreneurial 
methods of achieving rapid growth which do not require recourse to equity finance (Welter 
et al. 2016). 
 
Low usage of VC  may be due in part to the heterogeneity of sectors and industries in which 
HGFs operate, some of which may have limited history of engaging with VC or business angels 
(consumer services in the sharing economy, for example).  Furthermore, a recent study of 
rapidly growing firms in Cambridge, a very VC-rich environment, found no correlation 
between VC and rapid firm growth (Mohr et al. 2014).  The authors of the study speculated 
that UK entrepreneurs whose firms have good growth prospects avoid VC to prevent dilution 
of their ownership and control, at the cost of limiting their resource base and growth 
potential.  This has been empirically substantiated in another UK study, which found that 
rapidly growing firms do not necessarily wish to relinquish ownership to VCs (Parker et al. 
2010). 
                                                          
8 Berger and Udell (1998) note that during the 1980s approximately 15% of US IPOs emerged from VC-based firms.  
9 Importantly, in this survey a SME is defined as having less than 500 employees, a substantial departure from the OECD SME definition 
adopted by most EU countries. Thus, the proportion of smaller firms using this form of finance may be even more limited. 
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VC is undeniably an important part of the funding ecosystem for many high-tech firms with 
strong growth ambitions in certain locations (Nightingale et al. 2009; Brown and Mason 2014).  
It is also much more readily available in certain dynamic geographic contexts (Martin et al. 
2005) and is likely more important for firms operating in industries where lean approaches 
are not realistic (e.g. life science firms, pharmaceutical companies etc.) and funding costs are 
large.  Numerous studies have shown the valuable role VC plays in terms of providing coaching 
(Baum and Silverman 2004), network development (Shane and Cable 2002) and signalling 
effects to further investors (Hsu, 2007).  Its role in generating rapid growth is, however, 
difficult to precisely disentangle, leading some to question whether VCs pick or back winners 
(Baum and Silverman 2004).  Indeed, early growth may itself be a factor that attracts venture 
capitalists, reflecting the “interactive effects that operate in complex dynamic systems” 
(Mohr et al. 2014, 22).  
 
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly emphasises that the vast majority of SMEs in many 
developed economies are much more reliant on traditional sources of debt financing for 
growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  Indeed, it has been argued that HGFs have lower 
availability of financial resources (Moreno and Casillas 2007) and may actually incur much 
greater difficulties raising debt funding than non-HGFs (Lee 2014), although this has 
subsequently been contradicted by other recent studies (Vanacker and Manigart 2010; Brown 
and Lee 2014).  Interesting recent evidence suggests that rather than being prevented from 
accessing bank credit, they are more likely to pay higher interest rates on loans than typical 
SMEs (Rostmakalaei and Freel 2016).  While this could reflect the riskier nature of these firms 
to banks, another explanation in accordance with the “pecking order thesis” of fund raising 
(Myers and Majluf 1984) is that HGFs may tolerate costlier debt finance over risk equity 
finance in order to retain ownership of their business. Policy-makers should therefore resist 
the traditional approach of over-emphasising the role of venture capital funds and put greater 
emphasis on developing a wider range of different types of finance for firms with high growth 
ambitions.  Recognition of the need to boost a wide variety of funding sources should be 
strongly embodied in organisations such as the British Business Bank.   
 
Myth #5 HGFs undertake steady linear growth  
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A widely held assumption, within the early firm growth literature – which remains evident in 
policy frameworks and institutional logic to this day – is the mistaken belief that firms typically 
experience steady linear growth.  Dating back to the early 1970s, firm growth was depicted 
as something akin to the human life cycle, whereupon firms transitioned orderly between set 
stages from inception to growth, maturity, decline and then death (Churchill and Lewis 1983).  
This approach became widely embraced by entrepreneurship and firm growth scholars, to 
the extent that 104 different stage models have been published since the early 1960s (Levie 
and Lichtenstein, 2010).  The life-cycle models reached their peak in the entrepreneurship 
literature in the mid-1990s (Phelps et al. 2007).   
 
This linear view remains prevalent within the HGF policy community.  The vast majority of 
HGF policy frameworks reviewed demonstrated that programmes are still designed to work 
through the firm life cycle – from start-up units, leading to growth (or account management) 
programmes, to finally mature scaling programmes for established organisations.  This is 
currently the approach is use within Scotland through Scottish Enterprise, as well as Northern 
Ireland via InvestNI.  Indeed, simplistic stage growth models are often promoted by scholars 
to help inform policy makers in the design of their high-growth support activities (see Autio 
et al. 2007, 12).10   
 
Despite this, in recent years empirical and conceptual papers have strongly questioned the 
validity of this engrained erroneous belief (Levie and Lichtenstein 2010; Brown and Mawson 
2013). While there are some rare examples of firms that can undertake and sustain 
abnormally high levels of growth for a period of time, these are very much the exception 
rather than the rule (Satterthwaite and Hamilton, 2016).  One of the earliest empirical studies 
of HGFs noted the inner turmoil and sense of infallibility that engulfs firms experiencing rapid 
growth, increasing the likelihood of failure in these firms (Hambrick and Crozier 1985).  
Moreover, a considerable amount of research demonstrates that instead of transitioning 
through relatively orderly growth stages, rapid growth is erratic, unpredictable, sporadic and 
often of limited duration (Coad 2009).  This means that growth is very much a firm-specific 
                                                          
10 This highlights how myths in the academic world can spill over into the policy world.   
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process where “periods of growth, plateaus, backslides and changes seem to be distinctive to 
each enterprise” (Credit Suisse 2012, 5).      
 
HGFs are noted in the literature to undergo longer periods of low or no growth, punctuated 
by short ‘bursts’ of rapid growth (Garnsey et al. 2006). Such bursts of growth have been found 
to result from external growth opportunities or ‘growth triggers’, rather than being related to 
a firm’s current lifecycle stage (Brown and Mawson 2013).  Whilst much firm support is 
targeted towards firms at an early stage of their life-cycle, the empirical evidence suggests 
that rapid growth will often occur when firms are more fully developed ventures.  Indeed, 
promoting periods of rapid growth in early stage ventures could have extremely detrimental 
and unintended consequences for the longer-term survival of some firms.  So, while beneficial 
for some, it can be a “double edged sword” for others (Mohr et al. 2014, 234).    
 
It is therefore essential to reiterate that rapid growth is rarely sustained in the longer term 
(Hölzl 2014).  Indeed, the reverse is often the case: a period of rapid growth can often 
jeopardise the long-term stability of some ventures (Delmar et al. 2013) especially those firms 
run by less experienced entrepreneurs or top management teams (TMTs) (Barringer et al. 
2005; Nicholls-Nixon 2005).  The vast majority of recent work confirms that high growth is not 
sustainable and that most HGFs are in fact ‘one-hit-wonders’ (Daunfeldt and Halvarsson 
2015).  Another recent UK-based study labelled them ‘Icarus firms’ on account of their 
susceptibility to liquidate following a period of rapid growth (Lee et al. 2016).   While there is 
little research on the unique managerial challenges confronting HGFs (Wennberg 2013), one 
study found that firms are unlikely to be successful if they draw lessons from previous growth 
experiences and try to apply them to different points in time (Parker et al. 2010).  Another 
found that larger TMTs with industry experience in relevant sectors appear to be more 
capable of coping with the turbulence and unpredictability resulting from rapid growth 
(Barringer et al. 2005).   
 
The idiosyncrasies of firm growth patterns and the varied capabilities of TMTs mean that most 
firms struggle and encounter severe ‘growing pains’.  Despite this, most policy frameworks 
are driven to promote rapid growth within firms, irrespective of the longer term 
consequences.  Indeed, some policy makers in New Zealand acknowledge that “some policies 
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to stimulate rapid growth may (inadvertently) increase the volatility of firm performance” 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2013, 18).  The policy landscape, however, 
remains firmly focused on pushing firms through the key ‘lifecycle’ stages, rather than taking 
a more nuanced and firm-specific approach.  One exception was the UK’s flagship Growth 
Accelerator programme, which took a more individualistic approach to firm development and 
growth. It was replaced in early 2016 with a move back to traditional staged funding models 
via Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs).  Helping firms manage growth would seem a sensible 
direction for future policy initiatives, rather just promoting ‘high growth’ per se.   
 
Myth #6 HGFs grow organically 
Just as early academic work on firm growth viewed it largely (and in hindsight erroneously) as 
an incremental or linear occurrence (Levie and Lichstenstein 2010; Brown and Mawson 2013), 
many policy makers still view growth largely as an organic internally driven phenomenon 
based on a firm’s own internal resource base.  As a result, the institutional logic of HGF policy 
makers, as reflected in policy documents, continues to assume that growth is a simple and 
linear organic process rather than a result of acquisition or organisational change, with 
policies designed accordingly to focus on organic growth.  This is evident in the typical 
company building programmes on offer across the world, which aim to build companies from 
scratch (seed funds, innovation support, premises etc).  Recent research suggests, however, 
that a significant number of HGFs emerge from existing firms that are undertaking a period 
of organisational change such as a management buy-out (MBO) and management buy-in 
(MBI) (Mason et al. 2015).  Despite this, researchers note that high growth initiatives in the 
UK have explicitly precluded MBOs and MBIs from participation in these programmes 
(Smallbone et al. 2002).  
 
This can be linked to the dominant Resource-Based View of early firm growth, which stressed 
the importance of firms accruing sufficient internal resources before they could grow 
(Garnsey 1998).  While organic growth remains the dominant mode of growth for most SMEs, 
many of whom do not grow, the literature recognises that other models of growth are 
increasingly utilised by HGFs (McKelvie and Wiklund 2010), although these remain under-
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reported within the literature.11   Indeed, another recent study found that entrepreneurial 
entry via entrepreneurial acquisition was correlated with greater levels of managerial 
experience (Parker and Van Praag 2012).  In other words, growth-oriented entrepreneurs may 
side-step organic growth via aggressive entrepreneurial expansion through acquisition.  
 
The growing evidence base suggests that this earlier picture of rapid growth as organic and 
internally generated is somewhat reductionist (McKelvie and Wiklund 2010; Brown and 
Mawson 2013).  Given the heterodox resource needs of most rapidly growing firms, be they 
technology-related, people-related or finance-related, it comes as little surprise that most 
firms will seek these resources outside the boundaries of the firm.  For example, a significant 
proportion of UK HGFs are involved in acquisition activity.  Looking over the period 2003-
2012, approximately 20% of the UK HGFs identified in one study had undertaken one or more 
acquisitions (Mawson 2012). The majority of these acquisitions were of other UK firms, while 
25% comprised acquisitions of overseas-based firms.  Other recent research has also found 
that UK high growth SMEs were almost four times more likely to undertake an acquisition 
than non-high growth firms (Brown and Lee 2014).  Unquestionably, more research is needed 
to explore and unravel the relationships between organic and acquisitive growth, particularly 
from a strategic growth perspective (Gilbert et al. 2006). 
 
Another issue to consider is the role that hybrid growth strategies, such as inter-firm alliances, 
play in promoting rapid growth in firms.  Alliances can help alleviate the resource constraints 
in some smaller firms (Barringer et al. 2005), legitimise and serve as endorsements of a firm’s 
technology (Dacin et al. 2007), and act as a conduit into overseas markets by reducing the so-
called ‘liability of foreignness’ in external markets (Johanson and Vahlne 2009).  Indeed, 
research in the UK’s Cambridge high-tech cluster showed that HGFs have a higher proclivity 
to establish alliances with other firms (Mohr et al. 2014).  Other work examining the 
internationalisation processes of Scottish HGFs found that such strategic alliances enable 
firms to piggyback on pre-existing relationships, which helps them to become more 
                                                          
11 This has been due in large part to (i) the inherent methodological complexities involved in differentiating organic growth from growth via 
acquisition when examining growth businesses using databases (Daunfeldt et al. 2015a) and (ii) that research on this issue has shown that 
organic growth is typically associated with smaller young firms whereas other non-organic growth modes are linked to larger more mature 
firms (Delmar et al. 2003).   
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internationally oriented (Mason et al. 2015).  Furthermore, Brown and Mawson (2016b) 
found that informal alliances are, in some instances, a precursor to acquisitions.   
 
Despite the prevalence of these external growth strategies, public policy currently pays little 
heed to fostering such external connections within HGFs, or looking to promote modes of 
growth outwith traditional organic growth. Indeed, to our knowledge no bespoke policy 
initiatives exist to promote entrepreneurial entry (or business growth in general) via 
acquisitions despite their fundamental importance for many HGFs (Mawson and Brown 
2016). While there may be important displacement issues in terms of supporting firms 
wishing to undertake acquisitions, particularly domestically, there needs to be greater 
recognition amongst policy circles that entrepreneurial entry and firm growth is not solely an 
organic phenomenon. 
  
Myth #7 HGFs are the same irrespective of their location 
In recent years, scholars have paid more attention to the localised environmental context 
mediating the entrepreneurial process (Welter 2011; Mason and Brown 2014; Welter et al. 
2016).  Recent research shows that although HGFs are found in all regions and in all types of 
geographical environments (large cities, small towns, rural areas), there are geographical 
clusters that account for a disproportionate number of these firms (Motoyama and Danley 
2012; Rice et al. 2016).  For example, a study of Dutch HGFs found they were 
disproportionately located in highly urban and accessible rural areas (Stam 2005).  Given 
there seems a strong spatial logic to the geography of HGFs, further understanding of the 
local factors associated with the emergence and impacts of these firms is important for 
stimulating regional development (Li et al. 2016; Brown and Mawson 2016b).   
While attempts have been made to examine the impact of HGFs across regions, a key 
assumption within UK policy circles is that HGFs have the same impact on job creation and 
wider economic development regardless of their regional location (Brown and Mason 2012), 
as evidenced from policy frameworks with identical targeting, support mechanisms, and 
expected outcomes from set programmes across spatial locations (see OECD 2013).  On the 
face of it, there appears to be a universal approach towards HGFs, treating them the same 
irrespective of their physical location. This is reflected in similar policy approaches to support 
HGFs across most advanced economies. A benchmarking review of HGF public support 
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programmes undertaken by the OECD found strong consistency across OECD countries in 
terms of client groups, the thematic nature of support and delivery structures (OECD 2013).  
Indeed, a strong thread running throughout these programmes was the lack of spatial 
customisation in terms of policy support.  Many of the programmes reviewed were nationally 
rather than federally (or locally) administered, which could potentially undermine “the 
tailoring of the programme to local development needs” (OECD 2013, 29).  Clearly, the 
support needs of a firm in rural Iowa will be different to one in downtown Manhattan.     
 
From recent academic studies, however, the economic impact of HGFs does appear to vary 
spatially.  For example, Scottish HGFs have been found to create considerably fewer jobs on 
average than their UK counterparts, with the geography of the jobs created by HGFs far from 
localised (Brown and Mawson 2016b).  As Scottish HGFs are more likely to have physical 
operations abroad than non-HGFs, the consequence is that as these firms grow, their 
employment and overall ‘footprint’ in their home region may diminish (Mason et al. 2015).  
Whilst further research is needed to fully explore the regional impacts of HGFs in a wider 
range of spatial contexts, the available evidence suggests that there might be marked regional 
variations in their economic impact. If, for example, a region has a strong manufacturing 
sector dominated by export-oriented manufacturing firms, local firms have the possibility to 
grow through exporting.  In turn this will maintain their local employment base.  A service 
sector firm, in contrast, may have no choice but to grow where their customers are located.   
 
Policy makers therefore need to be cognisant of such variations, in order to ensure that 
interventions best address regional needs and guard against ‘policy universalism’ (Mason et 
al. 2015).  This, however, goes against the strong emphasis on risk equity funding, universities, 
high-tech sectors and organic growth modes which are firmly embedded in high growth 
policies irrespective of the surrounding contextual environment.  Whilst there appears to be 
a predilection to look to other geographies (e.g. Silicon Valley) for programmes and 
interventions to mimic at home, the empirical evidence base suggests caution in this regard, 
given the nuances of specific entrepreneurial contexts. Policy makers would be thus be better 
served by determining policy frameworks and programmes that best suit the needs of their 
own specific locations (Welter et al. 2011). 
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5. Public Policy Frameworks and High Growth Firms 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that there is a critical misalignment between the 
institutional logic of HGF policy makers (linked to the current design of high growth 
entrepreneurship policies) and the developing evidence base on the nature of HGFs.  
Unfortunately space precludes a full examination of why and how this situation has arisen, 
including the workings underpinning policy formulation and implementation. It is important, 
however, to explore this misalignment in context and to identify how high growth 
entrepreneurship policy can – and should – be brought in line with the current evidence. 
 
Many entrepreneurship policies are heavily shaped by the past and, as discussed, this is very 
much the case within the realm of high growth entrepreneurship.  Indeed, there seem to be 
very strong path dependencies, where older policy programmes drawing on an older 
(nascent) evidence base are tweaked to become high growth programmes, not always 
reflecting developments in the knowledge base and our understanding of these firms. One 
such example is the aforementioned High Growth Spinout programme within Scotland, 
previously known as the Proof of Concept Programme, which aims to commercialise 
university IP.  While the programme’s name has changed in line with its new ‘target market’, 
it remains largely the same programme with the same overall aims and objectives.  Ironically, 
reconfiguring interventions may in part stem from the increasing importance of measurement 
and project evaluation within public policy.  Given their extreme heterogeneity and lack of 
uniformity, it is very difficult for policy makers to identify HGFs ex ante. Thus, a bias towards 
easily ‘quantifiable’ factors such as age, sector, receipt of venture capital and status as a USO 
is attractive to policy makers not only as a means of pre-selecting firms to engage with on 
policy programmes and other firm support mechanisms, but also to measure and quantify the 
outcomes and benefits of public expenditure.  
 
The evidence documented within this paper has shown that the heterogeneous nature of 
HGFs strongly refutes the view held by some (Chan et al. 2006) that HGFs have homogeneous 
support needs.  Indeed, this heterogeneity raises a number of key issues that should be 
reflected in future enterprise policies aimed at supporting growth-oriented firms.  While not 
exhaustive, the following suggestions provide a basis for a much more realistic approach 
aimed at designing effective support to help germinate and grow more successful and, just as 
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importantly, more sustainable growth firms.  We have focused on a number of key thematic 
issues which could potentially help inform future policy making.  While we suggest some 
alternative potential policy approaches, other areas also merit further consideration in light 
of the emerging evidence base.12 
 
5.1 Look beyond high-tech 
By prioritising support for high-tech firms, observers claim that policy makers are “looking in 
the wrong places” for HGFs (Mason and Brown 2013).  Despite contributing only a small 
proportion of HGFs, high tech SMEs have been found to be the focus for a disproportionate 
range of available support options (Yoo et al. 2012; Autio and Rannikko 2016). Many of the 
current support systems for SMEs focus on more generic interventions such as R&D assistance 
and financial support (OECD 2010), however firms operating in high-tech sectors of the 
economy are often able to access extra financial support from government programmes and 
higher education institutions for product design, technology development and innovation 
(Brown and Mason 2014).  For example, analysis of data from the Scottish Co-Investment 
Fund, established to invest alongside business angel groups, reveals that three sectors (digital 
and enabling technologies, life science and renewables) together account for 80% of all 
expenditure by value (Scottish Enterprise 2012).  This is also true for USOs, which often 
receive significant support under commercialisation policies such as proof-of-concept 
schemes and technology-transfer programmes operated by university technology transfer 
offices (Rothaermel 2007; Harrison and Leitch 2010; Brown 2016).  
 
Of course, a lack of high-tech HGFs can be viewed in one of two ways.  Some could suggest 
that these firms need (and indeed merit) more assistance to help them grow, especially given 
the knowledge spillovers and positive externalities generated by new technology-based firms 
(Storey and Tether 1998; Audretsch and Lehmann 2005).  In other words, high-tech firms 
should be prioritised further to create more of them (Satterwaite and Hamilton 2016). 
Alternatively, a counterargument would be that if high-tech sectors provide relatively few 
HGFs it begs the question of why policy makers focus their efforts so strongly towards these 
                                                          
12 Interestingly, a recent survey of HGFs found that 74% of HGFs ranked access to talent as one of their top three growth constraints 
compared to 22% that cited access to venture capital (Coutu 2014). While the literature on HGFs and HRM strategies is almost negligible 
(Demir et al. 2016), this would suggest that a key growth bottleneck for HGFs is effective recruitment and talent management.   
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sectors.  In our view, high-tech firms probably do need different types of specialist support 
than more mundane firms.  However, from our review we strongly believe that policy makers 
should avoid excessive sectoral prioritisation in support and we would caution against 
implicitly favouring high-tech firms through R&D based eligibility criteria.  Whilst support for 
high-tech firms is certainly warranted, and necessary, to promote a diverse business base 
(Satterthwaite and Hamilton 2016), these policies alone are unlikely to reach or generate 
more HGFs. Thus, policy makers should move away from the current high tech fixation to a 
more inclusive and nuanced view of where these firms originate from.   
 
Support for growing firms therefore needs to reflect the diverse nature of their business 
activities, prioritising support for firms with growth ambitions and potential, rather than 
those with a particular sectoral or R&D focus (Buss 2002; Bleda et al. 2013).  The current focus 
on innovation should be extended to include a wider definition of the term. There is growing 
recognition of the importance of ‘hidden’ types of innovation, and that many HGFs procure 
from ‘open sources’ of innovation such as suppliers, customers and end-users (NESTA 2007; 
von Hippel 2009; NESTA 2010).  Incorporating this wider view of innovation would in itself 
broaden support to a wider array of sectors, especially services.  Interventions to foster 
stronger links with customers and end-users would be particularly beneficial, as research has 
identified that strong engagement with customers can be a powerful source of both 
innovation and firm growth (Mawson 2014).   
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that policy makers are becoming much more focused on 
taking a wider perspective within innovation policy (Warwick, 2013).  This is evident in the 
overall thrust of the EU’s wider regional policy framework of ‘Smart Specialisation’, which 
eschews high-tech initiatives and focuses more on promoting local entrepreneurial processes 
and upgrading the existing industrial fabric of regions (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). 
Again, space does not permit a full assessment of this particular policy framework, particularly 
the ongoing debate about finding the ‘optimal’ levels of technological adoption and 
specialisation which we recognise as being very important. While top-down EU policy 
frameworks aspire policy makers to think more widely, local policy formulation often remains 
deeply at odds with these strategic aims. Indeed, in some locations regional innovation policy 
remains heavily focused on R&D and flagship initiatives as a means of creating more HGFs 
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(Brown et al. 2015).  This disconnect between policy actors at different spatial levels is likely 
one of the reasons why the ‘myths’ discussed remain present within public policy discourse 
and programming.        
 
5.2 Think about the timing of interventions 
The timing of interventions is a critical - but often overlooked - consideration.  Some authors 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2008) have developed the concept of ‘evolutionary targeting’, which 
focuses on market-led evolutionary development processes. This entails ‘triggering and 
sustaining’ the emergence of multi-agent structures to help nurture nascent new innovative 
industries (Avnimelech and Teubal 2008).  While these arguments refer to how policy makers 
deal with nascent industries as a whole, the importance of temporal episodes also applies to 
firm-specific interventions.  Given that many firms encounter ‘trigger points’ that instigate a 
period of organizational change (Brown and Mawson 2013), interventions focused on HGFs 
need to be responsive to time-sensitive company needs.  Research has identified that firms 
enter a transition phase following a trigger point: the decisions, actions and processes 
undertaken during this time have a direct impact on whether firms will successfully capitalise 
on the trigger points and achieve growth (Brown and Mawson 2013). This is an ideal time for 
policy intervention, which could include, inter alia, support pre and post-acquisition, 
leadership development during and after a change in company management or leadership, 
or even advice on regulatory changes and legislation and their potential impact.   
This approach would necessarily require a policy shift from reactive, time-bound assistance 
towards more temporal, flexible and proactive support mechanisms. It would undoubtedly 
be more people-intensive to deliver than larger-scale and more transactional initiatives such 
as financial assistance.  However, to compensate for higher delivery costs, this kind of 
bespoke support could be heavily targeted.  For example, rather than supporting a large 
number of high potential SMEs over a period of time as most public sector agencies do, short 
periods of in-depth engagement with a small number firms on the cusp of significant growth 
could be an alternative modus operandi for business support organisations.  The costs of this 
kind of support could also be partly offset by financial contributions from supported firms.  
An added benefit of this kind of matched funding is the greater degree of organisational ‘buy-
in’ from firms this approach often engenders (OECD 2013).   
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5.3 Focus on relational and peer-based support 
Growth-oriented firms often desire in-depth relational support more than financial assistance 
(Mason and Brown 2013), with HGFs preferring to obtain advice from their peers, rather than 
policymakers, intermediaries or consultants (Fischer and Reuber 2003). Relational rather than 
transactional aspects of support are thus crucial. Again, we do not recommend forgoing 
transactional support entirely, but rather to reconsider the balance between the two as, in 
light of empirical evidence, peer-based interventions are likely to be of significant benefit to 
growth businesses. Indeed, a number of the interventions such as the UK’s (former) Growth 
Accelerator programme and the Companies of Scale programme in Scotland have strong 
peer-based elements built into these programmes (OECD 2013).13    
 
Such relational elements could include, inter alia, using highly experienced entrepreneurs to 
help ‘peer review’ certain skills and competencies of other growing firms, ‘implanting’ 
successful entrepreneurs in high potential businesses to provide strategic guidance, and other 
networking activities. Mentoring by peers has been found to increase the entrepreneurial 
self-efficacy of less established entrepreneurs (Crompton et al. 2012).  Growing firms could 
therefore be encouraged to develop ‘peer’ support through the use of non-executive 
directors, who are often a useful ‘sounding board’ to management teams.  These forms of 
experiential learning would not only benefit the individuals and businesses involved, but also 
potentially a wider network of growth oriented businesses (Deakins and Freel 1998).  Peer-
based support approaches have obvious advantages for the public sector, as they are less 
expensive to operate than business mentoring through private sector intermediaries.  An 
added advantage is the potential for networking and peer-based knowledge transfer.  Peer-
based support may also help temper the ‘growth for growth’s sake’ attitude, which may be 
instilled in less experienced entrepreneurs and TMTs.  
 
5.4 Assistance with Ownership Change  
One aspect of public policy which is almost completely absent is support for ownership 
change.  Research shows that MBOs, MBIs and employee-buy outs often result in an existing 
business being reconfigured, which provides a fresh impetus to the ‘reborn’ business entity 
                                                          
13 As discussed earlier, the UK government terminated its flagship Growth Accelerator programme at the end of 2015. 
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(Wright et al. 2001).  More ambitious and growth-oriented entrepreneurs may have a strong 
preference for complex and high risk entry modes (Parker and Van Praag 2012).  While 
business advisory services for start-ups are a commonly accepted part of the enterprise policy 
landscape (Bennett 2008), perhaps similar services could be provided for entrepreneurs 
seeking to undertake MBOs, MBIs or even an acquisition.   
 
Acquisition can allow firms to quickly upscale and, in some cases, even ward off the threat of 
being acquired. Plus, non-organic growth can often be a precursor to a future period of 
organic growth (Lockett et al. 2011).  Although traditionally associated with large firms, 
acquisitions appear to be of growing importance to innovative SMEs (Hussinger 2010), which 
comprise the future stock of HGFs.  CEOs of SMEs therefore need to become better 
acquainted with the complex processes involved in successfully executing such transactions.   
Similarly, given the evidence noted on the strong role and usage of alliances, there is also the 
potential for greater support to foster these types of interactive relationships.  With the 
exception of trying to foster links between firms and universities, policy rarely attempts to 
generate an external orientation within potential HGFs.  However, it is now well established 
within the literature that alliances and strategic partnerships can be important mechanisms 
for knowledge creation, end-user engagement and overseas expansion (Mohr et al. 2014; 
Brown and Mawson 2016b).  Given the importance of these types of relational connections, 
policy makers need to adopt systemic perspectives in assessing the support needs of HGFs 
(Mason and Brown 2014) rather than viewing them in isolation.     
5.5 Types of finance needed to fund high growth  
Finance in general is a critical issue for growing businesses and forms the “primary resource 
base from which other factor inputs are acquired” (Dobbs and Hamilton 2007, 306). To date, 
however, the volume of research on the funding issues within HGFs has been limited (Demir 
et al. 2016).  Given its important role in enabling growth, financing for HGFs should be an 
important consideration, and arguably a cornerstone, of high growth entrepreneurship 
policy.  At present, the primary focus of public policy in this area is the provision of venture 
capital.  However, recent studies show that public sector venture capital is largely ineffective 
in promoting the growth of firms (Nightingale et al. 2009; Grilli and Murtinu 2014).  Mason 
(2015) attributes this to several factors including an inappropriate investment focus (size of 
investments too small; technology orientation), the inability to provide larger follow-on 
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investments, and lack of competence to provide hands-on support. Moreover, offering 
venture capital at too early a stage in the development of the business will dilute an 
entrepreneur’s ownership, leaving them in a minority ownership position if further rounds of 
funding are required.   
 
Given that funding issues make it difficult for firms “with high growth potential to realise their 
potential” (British Business Bank 2016, 6), policy-makers therefore need to rethink and 
redesign the delivery of government sponsored venture capital schemes and also develop 
other types of funding support across a wider range of different funding sources.  One very 
cost effective solution is to help increase entrepreneurial financial literacy in rapidly growing 
firms. Help and support in assembling finance is considered to be one of the most important 
support needs of high potential firms (Smallbone et al. 2002).  Indeed, stimulating the 
demand for external finance is an important objective to increase entrepreneurial ambition 
in firms.  Research shows that entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital and more 
extensive networks have a greater knowledge of financial options (Seghers et al. 2012).  
Therefore, improving the ‘debt readiness’ of growth-oriented firms may be a useful approach 
(Rostmakalaei and Freel 2016).  Promoting newer forms of alternative finance such as 
crowdfunding could be another potential solution (Brown et al. 2015).   
 
While unsuited to the majority of HGFs, equity finance is clearly crucial for some (Coutu 2014).  
In particular, there is a gap for investments in the £1m-£10m plus range (BERR 2008), which 
can be addressed by a combination of publicly funded but privately managed funds and the 
development of networks – or pipelines – to bring in out-of-region equity investors (Mason 
2015).  Connecting HGFs with exogenous sources of funding in this way could be an innovative 
and effective mechanism for counteracting the negative impact of HGFs who are located in 
so-called ‘thin markets’ evident in some peripheral regional economies (Nightingale et al. 
2009).  Interestingly, more innovative high growth programmes take such as an approach. 
The NIY programme operated by Tekes seeks to connect local Finnish firms with external 
investors (Autio and Rannikko 2016), which is a similar approach to the famous and highly 
regarded Yozma programme in Israel (Mason and Brown 2014). More imaginative approaches 
such as these are needed to help stimulate both the demand for - and supply of - finance 
within HGFs. 
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6. Conclusion  
This debate article provides an important contribution to the entrepreneurship literature by 
dispelling some of the myths and assumptions embedded within high growth 
entrepreneurship policy. It makes further contributions to both the HGF literature and the 
entrepreneurship policy literature by highlighting how these myths have become translated 
into inappropriate policy initiatives.   
 
The central argument put forward in the paper is that policy makers have selectively utilised 
and/or misinterpreted the evolving high growth literature, resulting in myths and 
misconceptions about these firms becoming deeply embedded within policy frameworks.  In 
doing so, we have identified a clear mismatch between how policy makers perceive these 
firms and what they look like in reality.  How this perceptual gap has emerged is less clear.  
We have speculated about some of the factors fostering the myth-building process in policy 
communities, but more research is needed to tease out the origins and antecedents of why 
myths become so firmly embedded and widely propagated.   
 
We also demonstrate how these myths are strongly shaping the targeting of HGF policy (i.e. 
young and high-tech firms), thematic orientation of programmes (R&D support and VC co-
investment schemes) and eligibility criteria (age of firms, university spin-outs, organic growers 
etc).  These features are based on misconceptions of HGFs and do not correspond with the 
extreme heterogeneity exemplified within this diverse cohort of firms. We wish to stress that 
these myths are not applied universally by all policy makers in all contexts and in all 
programmes. Policy makers are, in some cases, starting to adjust their frameworks in light of 
the developing evidence base on HGFs, however this appears to be a very slow process.  A 
lack of systematic, rigorous and holistic policy and programme level evaluations possibly 
enables these myths to endure (Stam et al. 2007).   
 
An important scholarly function is to question myths in order to prevent mistakes from being 
repeated (Gibb 2000; Rehn et al. 2013).  With the level of cuts being made to public 
expenditure at the present time, it is more important than ever to push “aside false myths” 
about what the state can and cannot do to stimulate entrepreneurship (Mazzucato 2013, 198) 
whilst also challenging the exaggerated qualities attributed to entrepreneurship (Verduijn 
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and Essers, 2013).  While this paper has tackled one set of myths, there are undoubtedly 
“many more myths to challenge” within the realm of high growth entrepreneurship policy 
and entrepreneurship policy more generally (Rehn et al. 2013, 549).  Not only will further 
myth-busting enhance scholarship within entrepreneurship, it will also aid the process of 
policy formulation and implementation.  It is only by questioning basic assumptions and 
providing detailed empirical evidence that myths can be effectively challenged and progress 
can be made towards more effective policy making.  
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